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A LIFETIME INCOME TAX
Herwig J.Schlunk*
Under current tax law, there can be considerableperiod-by-period
divergence between a taxpayer's after-tax income and her desired or
actualconsumption. This divergence will cause the taxpayer to borrow.
One can view such borrowing either as being incurred to fund
consumption, or as being incurred to fund the taxpayer's income tax
payments. If one takes the latter view, one can ask whether a good
income tax law should force a taxpayer to borrow to pay her taxes. I
answer the question in the negative, and propose a lifetime income tax
that would eliminate the need for typical taxpayers to borrow to pay
their income tax liabilities. Under such a regime, a typical taxpayer
would reap an affirmative benefit over her lifetime, because she would
be able to transfer borrowing from herself (a relatively inefficient
borrower) to the government (a relatively efficient borrower).
My paper breaks new ground. Other scholars have, over the years,
proposed a lifetime income tax structure, but they have done so
exclusively to eliminate the "unfair" burden that annual income
measurement imposes on taxpayers with volatile incomes. My paper
differs in that it demonstrates that there can be great gains from a
lifetime income tax -

indeed, the proverbial free lunch -

even for

taxpayers without volatile incomes.

. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., University of
Chicago. I would like to thank Lily Batchelder and Dan Shaviro for providing many
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

940

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:939

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTROD U CTION .............................................................................

940

II.

A N ILLUSTRATION .......................................................................

943

III.

THEORETICAL ISSUES ..................................................................

955
955
958
959

A . The A bility to Pay .................................................................
B . Incentive Effects ....................................................................
1. W ork vs. Leisure .............................................................
2. Savings vs. Consum ption ................................................
3. Social E ngineering ..........................................................
C. Incom e A veraging.................................................................

965

965
966

IV .

IM PLEM ENTATION ........................................................................

972

V.

C ON CLU SIO N .................................................................................

976

I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal income tax is assessed and collected annually. Each
taxpaying unit1 is required to measure and report its taxable income
annually, and to compute and pay its tax liability annually. This is
reasonable: in order for the federal government to be able to spend
periodically, it must collect revenue periodically. What more natural
tax period than the (taxable) year? 2 However, using the taxable year
creates a potential problem. A snapshot of a given year may well
present an incomplete picture of a taxpaying unit; a snapshot of a
given year's taxable income may well present an incomplete picture
of, for example, such taxpaying unit's "ability to pay" taxes. The
I What the appropriate taxpaying unit should be is a nontrivial question that is
studiously avoided in this paper. Thus, I take the tack of assuming a taxpaying unit
that is essentially identical to the one used in current federal income tax law, and fit
my proposed lifetime income tax regime to such unit.
2 Other tax periods are possible, of course. Academics have mused
about the
possibility of employing ever shorter tax periods, and in the limit of employing
continuous-time taxation. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains
Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1991). And they have mused about the possibility
of employing ever longer tax periods, and in the limit of employing lifetime taxation.
See, e.g., William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income Tax Purposes,47 J. POL.
ECON. 379 (1939).
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reason is simple: occurrences outside of the given tax year, which the
snapshot will generally miss, can have a profound effect on a
taxpaying unit's true financial status.3

In this paper, I argue that certain "typical" occurrences outside of
a given taxable year should be taken into account in determining a

taxpaying unit's income tax liability for such year.

These typical

occurrences include all of the "typical" taxpaying unit's consumption

(and consumption-related)

expenditures.4

That is, the typical

taxpaying unit will, over the course of its "life," choose to incur

consumption expenditures according to some temporal pattern. Its
choice will be subject to budget constraints. One such constraint is

that the present value of its expenditures must equal the present value
of its after-tax income.5 Another constraint is that the present value
of its expenditures through any given date must be less than or equal
to the present value of its after-tax income through such date plus its
borrowing capacity as of such date. Thus, as of a given date, it may be
a borrower (if the present value of its expenditures through such date

is greater than the present value of its after-tax income through such
date) or a lender (if the opposite is true). Indeed, I believe that early
in its life, the typical taxpaying unit will be a borrower, since its
expenditures on higher education, owner-occupied housing, and
dependents will exceed its income. Later in life, it will become a
lender, as productivity gains lead to wage increases and as dependents

leave the nest.
3 The snapshot does not miss all noncontemporaneous occurrences.
Thus, for

example, income averaging, when permitted, causes a given taxable year's tax liability
to be influenced by income earned in adjoining taxable years. Similarly, the ability to
carry net operating losses or net capital losses backward or forward also causes a
given year's tax liability to be influenced by income earned in adjoining taxable years.
4 I include in this category expenditures on higher education and expenditures
on owner-occupied housing.
5 For purposes of this equality, I classify gifts and bequests made by a taxpaying
unit, including gifts and bequests made to fund the higher education of such unit's
children, as consumption expenditures. Hence, such gifts and bequests are included
in the first term of the equality, and so must be funded out of after-tax income. This
is generally in accord with current tax law. I do not need to make any similar
classification of gifts and bequests received by a taxpaying unit. Nonetheless, under
the lifetime income tax proposed in this paper, I would generally classify such gifts
and bequests as taxable income, except to the extent that they are in amounts not in
excess of the amounts received by a typical taxpaying unit to pay for its higher
education. Obviously, this classification is generally not in accord with current tax
law. However, it is in accord with my objective to concentrate a taxpaying unit's
income tax payments in tax periods in which such unit has resources in excess of those
required for typical consumption.
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The current income tax regime, while providing modest
allowances for certain consumption expenditures, including those on
education, owner-occupied housing, and dependents, does not make a
significant effort to conform the typical taxpaying unit's stream of
consumption expenditures to its stream of after-tax income. In
particular, under current law, the typical taxpaying unit will early in its
life generally be both a borrower and a taxpayer (i.e., it will have
positive income tax liability). Equivalently, but more provocatively,
the typical taxpaying unit will early in its life generally find itself in the
situation where it must borrow to meet its federal income tax liability. 6
If this is indeed the case, one can argue that such unit has no real
"ability to pay" taxes and should not be required to do so.
But I will not make this argument. Instead, I will simply propose
an income tax regime that would not unnecessarily "compel" the
typical taxpaying unit to borrow to pay income taxes. Like the current
income tax, my lifetime income tax would be assessed annually.
However, it would be assessed not on the basis of the income earned
by the taxpaying unit in a given taxable year, but on the basis of the
income earned by the taxpaying unit over the course of its entire life.
Actual assessments would be calibrated so as to be positive only in
taxable years during which such unit would not need to borrow to pay
the tax. As a consequence, the typical taxpaying unit under the
lifetime income tax would on average carry a smaller debt burden
than it does under the current income tax (or than it would under any
other more traditional income tax). That, without more, is surely an
improvement over the existing tax regime.
It would be a hollow improvement, however, if the lifetime
income tax imposed on the government an equal and offsetting
detriment. But would a lifetime income tax be detrimental to the
government since it would allow the typical taxpaying unit to "defer"
certain income tax payments? The answer is yes: whenever a
taxpaying unit is not compelled to borrow to pay a given amount of
income tax, the government is effectively compelled to borrow an
identical amount instead to make up its resulting revenue shortfall.
Thus, borrowing by taxpaying units would be replaced by identical
amounts of government borrowing.
More accurately, explicit
borrowing by taxpaying units would be replaced by identical amounts
of implicit borrowing by such units, provided that revenue neutrality
6 I include within my definition of "borrow"

an inability to repay prior
borrowings. Thus, if the taxpayer has outstanding debt and cannot pay such debt
down because she must pay income taxes, she has effectively borrowed to pay the
income taxes.
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was imposed to require taxpaying units (on average) to pay sufficient
future income taxes to redeem the borrowing they have "transferred"
to the government. But even assuming such revenue neutrality, it
does not follow that a taxpaying unit would reap no benefit from the
lifetime income tax. For when the lifetime income tax substitutes
government borrowing for private borrowing, it substitutes an
exceedingly efficient borrower for a relatively inefficient borrower.
Thus, the lifetime income tax would allow the typical taxpaying unit to
pay a (significantly) lower rate of interest on its implicit borrowing
than it would generally be required to pay on explicit borrowing.7
This turns out to be a significant benefit indeed.
This paper is divided into three parts. Part II is an elaborate
illustration that follows the life of a "typical" taxpaying unit, a family
of four, and demonstrates the financial effect that different income tax
regimes have on such a unit. I believe that it provides both ample
motivation and ample justification for the lifetime income tax. Part
III is more theoretical, and attempts to position the lifetime income
tax within the framework of tax theory. In particular, it challenges the
conventional interpretation of the "ability to pay," it examines how
the lifetime income tax might affect incentives, and it compares this
conception of a lifetime income tax to lifetime income taxes proposed
by other academics. Part IV is practical, and consequently addresses
certain implementation issues. Among other things, it presents a
more traditional single-year income tax regime that would achieve
some or even most of the benefits of the lifetime income tax.
II. AN ILLUSTRATION
This is not an empirical paper. Rather, it is a paper based on
upper middle class life as seen through my own (arguably) upper class
lens. Of course, I neither believe nor intend to imply that the
"typical" taxpaying unit lives an upper middle class life. However, I
do believe that the typical taxpaying unit aspires to such a life, and
that is enough. In a "land of opportunity," where everyone is
presumptively above average, the tax law can, and I believe should, be
fashioned to accommodate, as best as possible, the efforts of those
who struggle to attain an upper middle class life.
The government will almost surely be able to pay interest at a lower real
interest rate than will the typical taxpayer, because lenders to the government know
that government debt represents the ultimate diversified portfolio of debt, backed not
just by the typical taxpayer's assets and earning capacity, but by all taxpayers' assets
and earning capacities and moreover, in the event of disaster, by a printing press.
7
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Purely to keep my illustration tractable, I make some simplifying
assumptions. First, I assume that my taxpaying unit faces no inflation.
Accordingly, I need not adjust income and expenditure accounts for
inflation. 8 Second, I assume that taxpaying units are confronted not
with a taxable year, but rather with a taxable five-year period.
Accordingly, I can divide a unit's life into twelve rather than sixty
periods, and so can comfortably fit such life onto a table that does not
consume an entire page.9
My illustration will focus on a "typical" taxpaying unit consisting
of two adults and two children, henceforth a "family." This choice is
purely illustrative; any other taxpaying unit would (with obvious
modifications) serve. My family will commence its tax existence at
that moment when the first of the two adults enters college. Since
persons aspiring to an upper middle class life generally attend better
schools, I assume that each adult will attend a good second-tier
college. I arbitrarily assume that the average cost of such a college is
30,000 per annum for four years (e.g., tuition of 20,000 and room and
board of 10,000). I further arbitrarily assume that exactly half of this
cost is typically borne by a student's parents and that the remainder is
typically funded by a loan that the student will repay out of her future
income. Thus, during the college years, each adult in this typical
family will borrow 60,000; the family as a whole will borrow 120,000.
My first five-year tax period begins with commencement from
college, and hence runs from age 23 through 27, based on the age of
the first adult in the family to enter the workforce. I assume that both
newly-minted graduates immediately enter the workforce, one at a
starter wage of 35,000 and the other at a starter wage of 33,000. I
assume that the higher wage earner remains in the workforce during
the entire tax period and that his wage increases linearly to 39,000
during such period. I assume that the lower wage earner remains in
the workforce for three years and that her wage increases linearly to
35,000 during those three years. After three years, the lower wage
earner temporarily exits the (paid) workforce due to the arrival of a
child. Aggregating the family's wages during the tax period yields
income of 287,000. See Table 2.
But the family also has expenses. If I assume that the cost of
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care for a young couple living just

If there were inflation, the illustration would be messier, but the results would
be the same.
9 Relaxing this assumption would make my tables larger, but would not have
8

any substantive effect.
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above the poverty level is 15,000 per annum, my couple with its
aspirations of upper middle class living should be expected to spend at
least twice that amount, or 30,000 per annum, not just on better food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, but also on such additional items
as transportation (a used car or two) and entertainment. Moreover, if
I assume that the cost of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care for a
young couple with a child living just above the poverty level is 18,000
per annum, my couple should be expected to spend at least twice that
amount, or 36,000 per annum, not just on better food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care, but also on such additional items as
educational toys and daycare. Aggregating the family's various
expenditures during the tax period yields outflows of 162,000. See
Table 1.
During the second five-year tax period (age 28 through 32), I
assume that the adult working for wages at the beginning of the
period continues to work for wages and that his wage increases
linearly from 40,000 to 44,000. In addition, I assume that the other
adult remains outside the (paid) workforce, in part due to the arrival
of a second child. Thus, during this tax period, the family has
aggregate income of 210,000. See Table 2. Offsetting this income are
the usual expenditures. In particular, if I assume that the cost of food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care for a young couple with two
children living just above the poverty level is 20,000 per annum, my
family should be expected to spend at least twice that amount, or
40,000 per annum. If it does so, its expenditures during this tax period
will total to 200,000. See Table 1.
During the third tax period (age 33 through 37), the adult working
for wages at the beginning of the period continues to do so; his wage
increases linearly from 45,000 to 49,000. In addition, the adult not
working for wages at the beginning of the period reenters the
workforce on a part-time basis once the younger child begins
kindergarten; for her labor, she initially receives a wage of 10,000,
which increases linearly to 14,000 by the end of the period.
Aggregating the family's wages during the tax period yields income of
295,000. See Table 2. As for the family's expenditures, per the
dictates of the American Dream, it will purchase a starter residence,
which I assume will cost 200,000. Obviously, such purchase will
occasion savings on rent. However, I assume that the costs incurred
first to fill (with appliances, furniture, etc.) and then to maintain a
residence will more than offset such savings. Moreover, other
expenditures may change in nature (e.g., diapers will be replaced by
bicycles), but are unlikely to change much in amount. Accordingly,

946
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40,000 per annum will continue to go towards the basics. See Table 1.
During the fourth tax period (age 38 through 42), the productivity
of the full-time wage earner continues to improve; accordingly, his
wage rises from 50,000 at the beginning of the period to 54,000 at the
end.
Meanwhile, the part-time wage earner increases her
participation in the workforce; as a result, her wage jumps to 20,000 at
the beginning of the tax period and then rises linearly to 24,000 at the
end. Aggregating the family's wages during the tax period thus yields
income of 370,000. See Table 2. As for basic expenditures, these
continue apace at 40,000 per annum. In addition, the family trades its
starter residence for a nicer second residence at an additional cost of
100,000. See Table 1.
During the fifth tax period (age 43 through 47), each adult
continues to enjoy annual productivity increases and concomitant
wage increases, the first seeing his wage rise from 55,000 to 59,000, the
second seeing her wage rise from 25,000 to 29,000. Thus, aggregate
income reaches 420,000. See Table 2. Basic expenditures, meanwhile,
begin to decline. In the second year of this tax period, the family's
first child goes to college; in the fourth year of the tax period, the
second child follows suit. Thus, non-education expenditures decline
from 40,000 in the first year, to 36,000 in the second and third years
(as the family becomes a three-person household), to 30,000
thereafter (as the family becomes a two-person household). On the
other hand, the family will incur education expenditures. To calculate
these, I assume that the parents treat their children in the same way in
which they themselves were treated: accordingly, they pay one-half of
each child's annual 30,000 college expenditure (recall there is no
inflation in my model). Thus, education costs of 60,000 with respect to
the older child and 30,000 with respect to the younger child are
incurred during this tax period. See Table 1.
During the sixth tax period (age 48 through 52), each adult
reaches peak productivity, and thus ceases receiving annual wage
increases. For the primary breadwinner, his wage tops out at 60,000;
for the secondary breadwinner, it tops out at 30,000. Thus, aggregate
inflows are 450,000. See Table 2. Moreover, since the family is now
effectively a two-person household, basic living expenses will be
30,000 per annum. Finally, the younger child finishes her remaining
two years of college; these cost the family 30,000. See Table 1.
During the seventh tax period (age 53 through 57), both empty
nesters continue their participation in the workforce, but experience
decreasing productivity. Thus, I assume that the wage of the primary
breadwinner declines from 59,000 to 55,000 during the period, and
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that the wage of the secondary breadwinner declines from 29,000 to
25,000. Aggregate income is therefore 420,000. See Table 2. As for
expenditures, these continue at the rate of 30,000 per annum. See
Table 1.
During the eighth tax period (age 58 through 62), the primary
breadwinner continues to see his wages decline, now from 54,000 to
50,000. The secondary breadwinner also continues to see her wages
decline, and partly as a result, chooses to retire when she reaches age
60. Thus, she only works for the first two years of the tax period, and
earns wages of 24,000 and 23,000, respectively. The result is aggregate
income of 307,000. See Table 2. Expenditures, meanwhile, remain
unchanged at 30,000 per annum. See Table 1.
During the ninth tax period (age 63 through 67), the primary
breadwinner experiences a further decline in his wages, and chooses
to retire when he reaches age 65. Thus, he only works for the first two
years of this tax period, and earns wages of 49,000 and 48,000,
respectively. This results in aggregate income of 97,000. See Table 2.
Basic expenditures again remain unchanged at 30,000 per annum.
However, upon reaching age 65, I assume that each adult begins to
incur extraordinary medical costs, not all of which are covered by
insurance or the social safety net. I assume these costs begin at 2,500
per person per annum, increase to 3,000 per person per annum when
an individual turns 70, increase again to 3,500 per person per annum
when an individual turns 75, and top out to 4,000 per person per
annum when an individual turns 80. In any event, during this tax
period, these medical costs total 15,000. See Table 1.
During the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth tax periods (age 68
through 72, 73 through 77, and 78 through 82, respectively), the family
has no member in the workforce; wage income is 0. See Table 2.
However, in the second of these periods, I assume that the family sells
its residence and recoups its 300,000 aggregate purchase price (recall
there is no inflation). Thus, the family can be viewed as having an
inflow of 300,000, or equivalently as having an expenditure of negative
300,000, during such period. I adopt the latter view. See Table 1 and
2. In addition, expenditures continue as before, meaning that 30,000
per annum is devoted to living expenses and that slowly increasing
amounts are devoted to medical expenses. Finally, to cleanly wrap up
the illustration, both adults die precisely at the end of the twelfth tax
period. See Table 1.
Given these assumptions, Table 1 summarizes the typical family's
expenditures during the twelve tax periods of its existence.

[Vol. 25:939
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TABLE 1.
Add'l
Amount
For The

Poverty
Subsistence

CONSUMPTION
Education

Housing

Medical

Cumulative
Consumption

Good Stuff

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

120,000
81,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
86,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000

81,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
86,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000
75,000

200,000
100,000
90,000
30,000

(300,000)

15,000
28,000
33,000
38,000

120,000
282,000
482,000
882,000
1,182,000
1,444,000
1,624,000
1,774,000
1,924,000
2,089,000
2,267,000
2,150,000
2,338,000

Table 2 summarizes the family's income and compares cumulative
income to cumulative expenditures. It appears to show that the

family's income comfortably exceeds its expenditures, at least in the
long run. This it clearly must do: every family must live within its
means.
TABLE 2.

INCOME COMPARED TO CONSUMPTION

Income

Cumulative
Income

pre-23

23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

287,000
210,000
295,000
370,000
420,000
450,000
420,000
307,000
97,000

287,000
497,000
792,000
1,162,000
1,582,000
2,032,000
2,452,000
2,759,000
2,856,000
2,856,000
2,856,000
2,856,000

Cumulative
Consumption

Cumulative
Income Less
Consumption

120,000

(120,000)

282,000
482,000
882,000
1,182,000
1,444,000
1,624,000
1,774,000
1,924,000
2,089,000
2,267,000
2,150,000
2,338,000

5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
138,000
408,000
678,000
835,000
767,000
589,000
706,000
518,000
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But, alas, the level of comfort is illusory. Two items have been
left out of Table 2: taxes (in this illustration necessarily only on wage
income) and interest (both as an outflow when cumulative
consumption exceeds cumulative income and as an inflow when
cumulative income exceeds cumulative consumption). To add taxes
to my illustration, I assume that the government "needs" to collect
income taxes in an amount equal to 15% of gross wage income. Table
To add interest to my
3 illustrates the necessary collections.
illustration, I assume that the typical family can borrow across fiveyear tax periods at a real after-tax interest rate of 15% (approximately
3% per annum, reflecting an average of the rates charged on student
loans, home mortgages, credit cards, and other consumer debt) and
can lend across five-year tax periods at a real after-tax interest rate of
10% (which I assume it can achieve by purchasing the government's
debt). Table 4 illustrates the effects of a 15% flat tax and interest
inflows and outflows on the family's cumulative budget.

TABLE 3.

NECESSARY TAXES-

Income

15% FLAT TAX

Requisite

Cumulative

Taxes

Taxes

43,050
31,500
44,250
55,500
63,000
67,500
63,000
46,050
14,550

43,050
74,550
118,800
174,300
237,300
304,800
367,800
413,850
428,400
428,400
428,400

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

287,000
210,000
295,000
370,000
420,000
450,000
420,000
307,000
97,000

428,400
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INCOME LESS CONSUMPTION AND 15% FLAT TAX AND
INTEREST

Cumulative
Income Less
Consumption

Cumulative
Taxes

Cumulative
Income Less
Cons. + Taxes

Cumulative
Interest

Cumulative
Income
Less Cons.
+ Taxes +

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

(120,000)
5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
138,000
408,000
678,000
835,000
767,000
589,000
706,000
518,000

(43,050)
(74,550)
(118,800)
(174,300)
(237,300)
(304,800)
(367,800)
(413,850)
(428,400)
(428,400)
(428,400)
(428,400)

(120,000)
(38,050)
(59,550)
(208,800)
(194,300)
(99,300)
103,200
310,200
421,150
338,600
160,600
277,600
89,600

(18,000)
(26,408)
(39,301)
(76,516)
(117,139)
(149,605)
(156,565)
(141,202)
(113,207)
(90,668)
(83,674)
(64,282)

Int
(120,000)
(56,050)
(85,958)
(248,101)
(270,816)
(216,439)
(46,405)
153,635
279,948
225,393
69,932
193,926
25,318

All's well that ends well: even when a 15% flat tax and interest
are added to the mix, the family stays within its means, at least when
viewed over its entire life. Still, the pattern of inflows and outflows is
striking. Early in the family's life, its income does not always cover its
consumption expenditures, much less the aggregate of its consumption
expenditures and its income tax payments, still much less the
aggregate of its consumption expenditures and its income tax
payments and the interest it must pay on its borrowings. Later, the
family's income begins to exceed its consumption expenditures, and
then the aggregate of its consumption expenditures and its income tax
payments, and ultimately the aggregate of its consumption
expenditures and its income tax payments and the interest it must pay
on its borrowings.
Of course, my illustration lacks realism. Even if the government
requires taxes equal to 15% of gross wages, it is unlikely to enact a
perfectly flat tax in order to collect such amount. In particular, the
government is unlikely to impose any tax burden on families with
absolutely no ability to pay. Thus, for example, the current federal
income tax code contains a 0% tax bracket that essentially serves to
exempt families living under conditions of poverty. Moreover, the
government may choose to effect additional redistribution through
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the tax code by imposing a tax rate schedule that is to some extent
progressive. Thus, for example, the current federal income tax code
imposes progressively higher marginal tax rates, ranging from 10% to
35%, on increasing amounts of income.
One possible progressive income tax regime would exempt from
taxation income required to maintain a poverty-level standard of
living. It would then impose a 15% tax on the next 160,000 of income
and a 30% tax on any additional income. Table 5 illustrates the taxes
imposed under this regime.' ° Table 6 illustrates how the typical family
would fare when such taxes and interest are taken into account.

TABLE 5.

NECESSARY TAXES - PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX
Income less
Poverty
Subsistence

Progressive
Income
Taxes

Cumulative
Taxes

pre-23
23-27

206,000

37,800

37,800

28-32
33-37

110,000
195,000

16,500
34,500

54,300
88,800

38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72

270,000
334,000
375,000
345,000
232,000
22,000

57,000
76,200

145,800
222,000

88,500
79,500
45,600

310,50
390,000
435,600

3,300

438,900
438,900
438,900
438,900

73-77
78-82

10 Note that the government must nominally collect more tax under the
progressive income tax than under the 15% flat tax, if (as I assume) it wishes to keep
the net present value of its tax collections unchanged. For purposes of calculating net
present value, I have assumed that the government can borrow at a 10% real interest
rate per five-year tax period (approximately 2% per annum). This is the same aftertax rate at which I previously assumed the family can lend since, among other
possibilities, it can always lend to the government (by buying government bonds).
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6. INCOME LESS CONSUMPTION AND PROGRESSIVE INCOME
TAX

Cumulative
Income Less

Cumulative
Taxes

Cumulative
Income Less

Cumulative
Interest

Cumulative
Income Less

Consumption

Cons + Taxes

Cons + Taxes

(120,000)
5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
138,000
408,000
678,000
835,000
767,000
589,000
706,000
518,000

(120,000)
(32,800)
(39,300)
(178,800)
(165,800)
(84,000)
97,500
288,000
399,400
328,100
150,100
267,100
79,100

(120,000)
(50,800)
(64,920)
(214,158)
(233,282)
(186,474)
(32,945)
152,613
279,275
235,902
81,492
206,641
39,306

+ Int

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

(37,800)
(54,300)
(88,800)
(145,800)
(222,000)
(310,500)
(390,000)
(435,600)
(438,900)
(438,900)
(438,900)
(438,900)

(18,000)
(25,620)
(35,358)
(67,482)
(102,474)
(130,445)
(135,387)
(120,125)
(92,198)
(68,608)
(60,459)
(39,794)

Once again, all's well that ends well: the typical family, even after
taking taxes and interest into account, remains within its means.
Thus, the illustration is conceivably realistic. But if it is realistic (and I
believe that it is), it highlights a problem. Early in the typical family's
life, its desired and compelled expenditures exceed its income, and so
it must borrow. Given the fungibility of money, it is equally correct to
view the family either as borrowing to pay for desired expenditures, or
consumption, or as borrowing to pay for compelled expenditures, or
taxes. I have no particular problem with the former: in a free society,
the family should be allowed to choose to borrow to pay for
consumption. I do, however, have a problem with the latter: unless
the government has a compelling reason to do so, it should not ask the
typical family to (explicitly) borrow to pay taxes.
I believe that the government lacks a compelling reason to impose
explicit borrowing on the typical family.
In particular, the
government could adopt an alternative tax regime that provides its
requisite revenue and that allows the typical family to engage in its
desired consumption, but that does not compel the typical family to
borrow to pay its taxes. One such regime, which I call the "lifetime
income tax," would function as follows. First, the typical family would
be allowed, during each tax period, an exemption equal to the poverty
subsistence amount. Second, the typical family would be allowed
lifetime deductions for the purchase of principle residences in
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aggregate amounts not to exceed 300,000; as a corollary, gains from
the sales of principle residences would be included in income. Finally,
the typical family's remaining cumulative lifetime income would be
taxed at the following rates: the first 500,000 at a 0% rate; the next
500,000 at a 45% rate; the next 500,000 at a 33% rate; any excess over
1,500,000 at a 27% rate.11 Table 7 illustrates the taxes imposed under
this regime. 12 Table 8 illustrates the typical family's financial results
taking both taxes and interest into account.
TABLE 7.

NECESSARY TAXES-LIFETIME INCOME TAX

Income less
Poverty
Allowance
& Residence

Cumulative
Taxable
Income

pre-23
23-27
28-32

206,000

206,000

110,000

316,000

33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52

(5,000)
170,000
334,000
375,000

311,000
481,000
815,000
1,190,000

53-57

345,000

58-62
63-67

232,000
22,000

68-72

(75,000)

1,714,000

73-77

225,000

1,939,000

78-82

(75,000)

1,864,000

1I

Taxes

Cumulative
Taxes

1,535,000

141,750
145,950
111,750

141,750
287,700
399,450

1,767,000
1,789,000

62,640
5,940

462,090
468,030
468,030

40,500

508,530
508,530

choose this particular schedule in part because, while providing the
government with the requisite revenue, it is on average (slightly) progressive. Thus,
the average rate of tax paid on taxable income begins at 0%, rises from 0% to 22.5%
over the course of the 45% tax bracket, rises further from 22.5% to 26% over the
course of the 33% tax bracket, and then slowly rises to 27% as income tends to
infinity.
12 Note
that cumulative taxes paid under the lifetime income tax
are
considerably higher than under either the 15% pure flat tax or the previouslyconsidered progressive income tax. Nonetheless, such taxes provide the government
with the same net present value of revenue, based on the government's 10% after-tax
borrowing rate.
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INCOME LESS CONSUMPTION AND LIFETIME INCOME TAX
AND INTEREST

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Income Less
Consumption

Taxes

Income
Less

Interest

Income
Less

Cons +
Taxes

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52

(120,000)
5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
138,000
408,000

53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

678,000
835,000
767,000
589,000
706,000
518,000

Cons +
Taxes + Int

(141,750)
(287,700)

(120,000)
5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
(3,750)
120,300

(18,000)
(19,950)
(20,693)
(37,296)
(45,891)
(53,337)

(120,000)
(13,000)
(4,950)
(110,693)
(57,296)
(49,641)
66,963

(399,450)
(462,090)
(468,030)
(468,030)
(508,530)
(508,530)

278,550
372,910
298,970
120,970
197,470
9,470

(46,641)
(23,450)
11,496
42,543
58,894
84,531

231,909
349,460
310,466
163,513
256,364
94,001

The net effect, taking taxes and interest into account, of moving
from the progressive income tax to the lifetime income tax, is that the
typical family ends up with an additional 54,695 of terminal net worth
(the excess of 94,001 under the lifetime income tax (Table 8) over
39,306 under the progressive income tax (see Table 6)). This
additional terminal net worth has a net present value of
approximately 13,350 when viewed from the beginning of the family's
existence. 3 This amount is approximately 1.25% of the net present
value of such family's lifetime consumption. In other words, moving
the typical family in a revenue neutral fashion from the progressive
income tax regime to the lifetime income tax regime would allow such
family to increase its lifetime consumption by 13,350 or 1.25%. In a
society that consists of 60-odd million typical families (or their
equivalents), the aggregate effect of such increases would be
approximately 800,000,000,000 (eight hundred billion).
This may look like magic, but it is not. It is entirely the result of a
simple fact: the typical family is an inefficient borrower as compared

This value is calculated using the same interest rates the family actually faces.
Thus, during periods when the family is a net borrower, a 15% rate is used, and
during periods when the family is a net lender, a 10% rate is used.
13
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to the government. 14 I have accounted for this fact by allowing the
government to borrow (and the family to lend) at a 10% after-tax
interest rate, while allowing the typical family to borrow only at a
higher 15% after-tax interest rate. To the extent that the government
channels the typical family's borrowing through itself - and that is
precisely what happens when the lifetime income tax replaces the
progressive income tax - the government allows such family to pay
interest at the lower 10% rate instead of at the higher 15% rate. In
this difference lies the typical family's entire gain."
III. THEORETICAL ISSUES

A. The Ability to Pay
As already noted, it is not necessary to try to justify the lifetime
income tax by arguing that it assesses taxes that better comport with
taxpaying units' abilities to pay taxes; even if it did not, it would
provide a significant benefit to taxpaying units without causing the
government any harm. Nonetheless, since "the standard justification
for using income as the tax base is that (1) taxes should be imposed on
[taxpaying units] in accordance with their relative abilities to pay, and
(2) a [taxpaying unit's] income is the best practical measure of [its]
ability to pay,"'16 it is not unreasonable to ask how the lifetime income
tax base fares as a measure of ability to pay.
Since the question is ultimately one of relative fit, the first order
of business is to ask how a more traditional income tax base fares as a
14

There are three primary reasons. First, no matter how well a lender to the

typical family can diversify her loan portfolio, she cannot do better than to hold the
family's loan as part of a portfolio that includes the obligations of all taxpaying units.
By lending indirectly to the family by lending directly to the government, she will
indeed hold such family's loan as part of such an optimally diversified portfolio.
Second, a lender to the typical family can do little to protect her loan against the
moral hazard of such family: strategic bankruptcy and so forth. By lending indirectly
to the family by lending directly to the government, she need not worry (so much)
about the family's potential moral hazard: the government's power of compulsion,
exercised through the tax law, allows it to collect on the indirect loan even when the
lender could not collect on a direct loan. Third, when all else fails, a lender to the
government, but not a lender to the typical family, can expect her loan to be satisfied
by the government's printing press.
15 Foreigners and tax-exempt organizations may be losers under
my scheme:
they will be forced to purchase lower-yield government debt instead of higher-yield
private debt.
16 RICHARD
TAXATION

SCHMALBECK

20 (2004).

&

LAWRENCE

ZELENEK,

FEDERAL
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measure of ability to pay. This will depend on what is included in such
tax base, and therefore on what is meant by "income." Unfortunately,
in spite of the cavalier way in which the word "income" is employed, it
is hardly self-defining: the Supreme Court has struggled to find a
definition" and Congress's definition is circular.
Economists and
9
academics employ yet a third definition,' but it deviates significantly
20
from the actual federal income tax base. So perhaps the best way to
proceed is to assume away the relevance of a (platonic) definition of
income.
If our government really wanted to impose taxes on
taxpaying units in accordance with their relative abilities to pay, it
would construct a measure of their relative abilities to pay and it could
then, if it chose, name such measure "income" or "taxable income."
Accordingly, I limit myself to the question of how the current income
tax base fares as a measure of ability to pay.
To answer this question, it is necessary to know what is meant by
"ability to pay." Again, this term is not self-defining. Indeed, I can
imagine a continuum of possible definitions, even in the case of a
typical taxpaying unit that by hypothesis lives more or less exclusively
off its wages (i.e., it receives no significant gifts or bequests). At one
extreme, a taxpaying unit's ability to pay could be measured by
something as broad as all of the cash it is ever expected to control: the
sum of its periodic wages and the present value of its expected future
wages. Somewhat less extreme, it could be measured by the sum of its
periodic wages and its borrowing capacity. At the other extreme, it
could be measured by something as narrow as the portion of its
periodic cash receipts that is not in a broad sense "spoken for": the
excess of its periodic wages over the sum of its periodic consumption
and its outstanding indebtedness. Somewhat less extreme, it could be
measured by the excess of its periodic wages over the sum of its
See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
18 "Gross income means all income from whatever source derived."
I.R.C.
§ 61(a).
19

The Haig-Simons formula defines income during a tax period as the sum of

(1) the market value of consumption during such tax period and (2) the taxpaying
unit's change in wealth during such tax period. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938);
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921).
20 The current federal income tax base excludes numerous
items that an
academic would include, such as gifts, imputed income, and unrealized asset
appreciation. In addition, it includes some items that an academic would exclude,
such as returns to the extent such returns reflect inflation.
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undesired consumption
and the interest it must pay on its
outstanding indebtedness. There are a myriad of other possibilities as
well.
The problem is that there is no a priori reason to prefer any one
of these definitions to any other. Nor is it impossible to imagine a tax
regime that adopts any one of these definitions. Thus, to focus on the
one that is most problematic from an implementation standpoint,
suppose that the tax base were defined as the sum of the taxpaying
unit's periodic wages and the present value of its expected future
wages. If a taxpaying unit's periodic wages are low, but its expected
future wages are high, the tax burden could easily exceed the unit's
access to cash. But why should this deter the government? The
government could accept the unit's IOU, at a suitable interest rate,
and could, moreover, loan the unit an additional amount, also at a
suitable interest rate, which the unit would be compelled to use to
purchase term life insurance in the amount of the tax liability and with
the government as the beneficiary. Thus, the taxpaying unit would
have a tax liability which, in the normal course, it would satisfy out of
future wages and which, in the case of premature death, it would
satisfy with insurance proceeds.
In any event, given the indeterminate nature of the ability-to-pay
inquiry, it seems to me that the lifetime income tax is based on as
good a measure as any other, and in particular on as good a measure
as that embodied in a traditional progressive income tax. For me, the
proof in the pudding comes from focusing on two tax periods that are
in some ways similar and in some ways not: the third (age 33 through
37) and the eighth (age 58 through 62). In each, the family's wage
income is roughly the same: 295,000 in the former; 307,000 in the
latter. See Table 2. Consequently, under the progressive income tax,
the family's tax liability is also (very) roughly the same: 34,500 in the
former; 45,600 in the latter.22 See Table 5. I find this result
unsatisfying since the family is a net borrower in the former tax
period, and indeed must borrow to satisfy any tax liability, but is a net
lender in the latter tax period, with plenty of cash to spare. Thus, I
21

Undesired consumption might include such items as unreimbursed medical

expenses and casualty losses.
22 To the extent that the progressive income tax would be imposed on net
interest expense or net interest income, the first of these amounts would be somewhat
lower and the second would be somewhat higher. This follows since I illustrate
interest flows in after-tax amounts. Correcting for this, taxes would be reduced by
4,173 to 30,327 in the former tax period and would be increased by 6,540 to 52,140 in
the latter.
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find that the tax liability that would be imposed under the lifetime
income tax - 0 in the former tax period and 62,640 in the latter (see
Table 7) - more closely tracks my personal notion of ability to pay.
But I accept that my personal notion may be eccentric.
B. Incentive Effects
The driving force that makes the typical family better off under
the lifetime income tax than it would be under a traditional
progressive income tax regime is that such family "transfers" some
borrowing to the government and thus realizes savings in interest
expense, even after taking into account that such family will on
average be required to pay off (with interest) the borrowing
23
"transferred" to the government . Of course, requiring a family to
pay off a borrowing on average is not really requiring it to pay off the
borrowing at all. Indeed, if self interest is taken into account, the
family could be expected to go to considerable lengths to attempt to
avoid paying off the borrowing. If all families behaved likewise, it is
conceivable that the government would run into serious difficulty.
But this is unlikely.
Every day, the federal government does precisely what I am
suggesting: it pays for goods and services with borrowings, all of which
could be avoided with current tax impositions, but are not. Each
government borrowing allows families to defer a potential tax
payment; in some cases, such tax payments would have been financed
by borrowing. Thus, even under current law, there is effectively a
transfer of borrowings from families to the government. It is true that
there is no necessary expectation that the families that actually
transfer borrowings to the government will ultimately pay them off;
instead, future generations may be called upon to pay off some or all
of such borrowings. But this fact does nothing to diminish the
families' "moral hazard" problem (and arguably exacerbates it).
Nonetheless, the government's ability to borrow does not appear to be
(significantly) negatively impacted. Evidently, credit markets remain
quite confident that the attempts of families (and their successors) to
avoid repaying borrowings transferred to the government will not, in
the aggregate, be successful.
That being the case, it only remains to consider the incentive
effects that would be produced by the lifetime income tax as a tax. In

These are not actual transfers, of course. They are transfers only relative to
the baseline of a more traditional progressive income tax.
23
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general, every income tax discourages work and encourages leisure,
since the former is taxed and the latter is not. In addition, every
income tax discourages savings and encourages consumption, since
the former is taxed twice and the latter is only taxed once. Both of
these effects are arguably undesirable. The question here is not
whether the lifetime income tax would produce these effects (it
would), but rather whether the lifetime income tax would produce a
greater quantum of these effects than does a more traditional
progressive income tax.
1. Work vs. Leisure
Economic theory suggests that a family's choice of work vs.
leisure will be affected by the marginal income tax rate it faces. To
wit, the family must derive the same utility (or enjoyment) whether it
devotes its final available hour to work (which produces incremental
consumption in an amount equal to the after-tax wage) or to leisure
(which produces, for example, an extra walk in the park). For
example, if the family is faced with the progressive income tax
illustrated in Tables 5 and 6, and is in any one of the tax periods in
which it finds itself solidly in the 30% tax bracket, it will work and
work and work until 70% of the wage earned in the final hour of work
produces incremental consumption that is no more desirable than an
extra walk in the park. Thus, the family has a simple decision
mechanism, and it applies this mechanism anew in each tax period.
While this is all rather clear in theory, it is less clear in practice.
Consider a family that has two adult members, one the primary
breadwinner and one the secondary breadwinner. In the case of the
primary breadwinner, his employer may or may not grant his request
to reduce his hours of work so as to properly align the enjoyment
received from an hour's after-tax wage and the enjoyment received
from an hour's leisure. Even if the employer grants his request, such
grant will almost surely affect his opportunities (promotions, raises,
etc.) in subsequent periods. Thus, the periodic work-leisure choices
made by the primary breadwinner of a family facing a traditional
progressive income tax are likely to respond only imperfectly to the
marginal tax rates imposed by such tax. In the case of the secondary
breadwinner, of course, there is likely to be a greater response.
However, to the extent that she has human capital, the value of which
will deteriorate with lack of use (i.e., an education), even she cannot
be too cavalier in eschewing work for leisure simply to align her
periodic margins because such myopic behavior can, in the long run,

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:939

seriously diminish her and her family's opportunity set.
What this means is that, even in the face of a traditional
progressive income tax, a family is not likely to make periodic workleisure choices based primarily on periodic marginal tax rates, but
rather is likely to make a lifetime work-leisure choice based on its
lifetime marginal tax rates. That is precisely what it would do under
the lifetime income tax. For example, if the typical family faced a
traditional progressive income tax, its lifetime work-leisure choice
would generally be based on a marginal tax rate of 30%, unless it
could shift its lifetime marginal hour of work into the second or the
ninth tax period. See Tables 5 and 6.
On the other hand, if the typical family faced the lifetime income
tax, its lifetime work-leisure choice would unambiguously be based on
a lifetime marginal nominal tax rate of 27% rate (which is reached
relatively late in its life). This marginal nominal tax rate, in turn,
would translate into still lower marginal effective tax rates, since a
wage earned in one period would not necessarily lead to a rise in taxes
paid in such period, but only to a rise in taxes paid in some future tax
period. Thus, for example, if the typical family depicted in Tables 7
and 8 earned an additional 100 in the 23-27 tax period, it would owe
an additional 45 of tax in the 43-37 tax period, save 12 of tax in the 4852 tax period, and save 6 of tax in the 53-57 tax period. All in all, it
would indeed pay an additional 27 of nominal tax. This additional tax,
however, would have a net present value of approximately 14.8 at the
time the additional wages were earned. Thus, the true marginal tax
rate would in fact be 14.8%. At the opposite extreme, if such family
earned an additional 100 in the 43-47 tax period, it would owe the
additional 45 of tax in the same 43-37 tax period, save 12 of tax in the
48-52 tax period, and save 6 of tax in the 53-57 tax period. Again, it
would pay an additional 27 of nominal tax. This additional tax,
however, would now have a net present value of approximately 29.8 at
the time the additional wages were earned. Thus, the true marginal
tax rate would in fact be 29.8%. Under my predicates, these two
possibilities represent the lowest and the highest marginal tax rates
the typical family would face. Thus, in every case, the after-tax
rewards from additional work would be unambiguously higher under
the lifetime income tax than they are under a traditional progressive
income tax. It follows that typical families would, all else being equal,
work more rather than less.24 And that should please the government.
24 The discussion in the text focuses solely on the so-called "substitution effect"

of a change from a progressive income tax to a lifetime income tax. There would also
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Moreover, a significant additional benefit would flow from the
unambiguous nature of the marginal tax rate under the lifetime
income tax. To the extent that families subject to a traditional
progressive income tax regime have the prospect of facing different
marginal income tax rates in different tax periods, they will adjust
their behavior, including (if possible) their periodic work-leisure mix,
to achieve optimal after-tax results. Thus, for example, if a family
faces a 30% marginal tax rate in one tax period, but is confident that it
will face a 15% marginal tax rate in the subsequent tax period, it will
attempt to shift income from the first tax period to the second tax
period, perhaps by working less in the former and more in the latter,
or by manipulating the reporting of income so that it appears to fall
less in the former and more in the latter. Neither of these behaviors is
particularly beneficial from a societal standpoint and neither would
occur under the lifetime income tax.25
Before leaving the discussion of work vs. leisure, it is worthwhile
to remember that not all families are typical families as defined in my
illustration.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to ask whether the
incentive effects produced by the lifetime income tax would be
manifestly different for families that are not typical. Thus, consider a
poor family, which I will define as a family with exactly one-half of the
annual wage income of the typical family. Such a family will not, of
course, incur the same consumption expenditures as will the typical
family. Nonetheless, it will be confronted with the same tax code,
containing either a traditional progressive income tax or a lifetime
income tax. Table 9 shows such family's tax payments under the
progressive income tax and the lifetime income tax (under the
additional assumption that such family does not, at any time, purchase
its residence).

be a "wealth effect." That is, under the lifetime income tax, the typical family would
be given an enhanced opportunity set - greater wealth - assuming it did not alter its
current work-leisure choice. So long as consumption and leisure are both "goods,"
the family would want to convert its increased wealth into somewhat more of each.
No matter the mix, it would work less. Thus, although the substitution effect would
lead the typical family to want to work more, the wealth effect would to some extent
mitigate this desire.
25 The design of the lifetime income tax generally makes it impossible to achieve
a better tax result by deferring income, since tax brackets are based on cumulative
rather than on periodic income. The one exception to this would occur in late tax
periods in a family's lifetime, when the possibility of having unused poverty
exemption amounts could induce such family to attempt to defer income.
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TABLE 9. POOR FAMILY'S TAX PAYMENTS
Gross
Wage
Income

Income
Less
Poverty
Subsistence

Progressive
Income
Taxes

Cumulative
Taxable
Income

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37

143,500
105,000
147,500

62,500
5,000
47,500

9,375
750
7,125

62,500
67,500
115,000

38-42

185,000

85,000

12,750

200,000

43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

210,000
225,000
210,000
153,500
48,500

124,000
150,000
135,000
78,500
(26,500)
(75,000)
(75,000)
(75,000)

18,600
22,500
20,250
11,775

324,000
474,000
609,000
687,500
661,000
586,000
511,000
436,000

Lifetime
Income
Taxes

49,050
35,325

I will ignore the fact that the poor family's tax payments under the
lifetime income tax have a net present value of only 66% of its tax
payments under the progressive income tax; to the extent that is
26
Rather, I will
considered to be a bad thing, it is easily rectifiable.
focus on the fact that the poor family's tax payments under the
lifetime income tax would be made in a significantly different pattern
than would its tax payments under the progressive income tax: 45% of
income earned late in the family's life would flow to the government,
replacing the 15% of income earned throughout the family's life that
trickles to the government under the progressive income tax.
Expressed in the language of marginal income tax rates, the family's
Revenue neutrality with respect to the poor family could be achieved as
follows. The size of the 0% tax bracket could be reduced to 400,000, with an
additional 100,000 exemption available only to the extent that the family incurs
educational (college) expenditures in excess of 20,000. Such change would not affect
the typical family. Moreover, such change would arguably align the structure of the
lifetime income tax more closely with its underlying motivation: educational
expenditures made early in the family's lifetime are a primary contributor to the
family's need to "borrow" to pay its taxes; to the extent that a family does not incur
such educational expenditures, or incurs less of them, it is not faced with the same
need to "borrow," at least not if it otherwise generally lives within its means. If, as
seems likely, the poor family fails to incur more than 20,000 of educational
expenditures, the additional taxes collected under this modified version of the lifetime
income tax would make up the government's revenue shortfall.
26
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current 15% marginal income tax rate would be replaced by a far
higher 45% marginal nominal income tax rate. This marginal nominal
income tax rate, in turn, translates into a marginal effective income
tax rate of approximately 16.9% for income earned in the 23-27 tax
period, and a marginal effective income tax rate of 45% for income
earned in the 53-57 or the 58-62 tax periods. These higher marginal
tax rates could well induce the family to work less, indeed perhaps
significantly less.
I think, however, there would be two mitigating factors. First, to
accomplish a strategic withdrawal from the 45% marginal tax bracket,
the family would need to precisely plan its lifetime work-leisure
choice. Even if it could accomplish the strategic withdrawal, what it
would find is that its reduced income would pay for only roughly 90%
of the consumption it had achieved under the progressive income tax
(and which consumption it could still achieve, provided it was willing
to confront the 45% tax bracket). Particularly for a poor family, this
strikes me as a rather dramatic decline in standard of living, and
hence, one such family would be unlikely to choose. 27 Second, I
believe that it would be difficult for the family to exercise the requisite
self-restraint with respect to its supply of work, at least early in its life.
That is, early in its life, the family will face not a 45% marginal tax
rate or even a 15% marginal tax rate, but what appears to be a 0%
marginal tax rate. 2' This tax rate will likely induce the family to march
more rather than less swiftly through the 0% tax bracket. When, at
last, it exits such tax bracket and confronts the 45% tax rate, it will
have little choice but to work or "starve." If it chooses to work
sufficiently hard, lower marginal tax rates beckon. If it chooses to
starve,...

Stated most strongly, the mix of consumption and leisure that the poor family
chose when confronted by a progressive income tax is still available under the lifetime
income tax; the only reason not to choose it is that some other pattern, such as the
one hypothesized in the text, is superior. The one hypothesized in the text involves a
10% decrease in consumption and a concomitant increase in leisure. Given the
generally low level of consumption enjoyed by the poor family, it would generally
place a relatively high value on consumption and a relatively low value on leisure.
Thus, it seems highly unlikely that such family will find the hypothesized trade-off
worthwhile.
28 This argument is based on the idea that taxpayers are not wholly rational,
but
rather are myopic. This myopia will lead them to discount too heavily future events,
including the imposition of future taxes. Thus, if the prospect of paying taxes at a
45% rate is sufficiently far off in the future, the effective marginal tax rate will indeed
appear to be close to zero.
27
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Finally, in Table 10, I repeat the foregoing exercise for a rich
family, which I define as a family earning wages equal to one-and-ahalf times those earned by the typical family. Again, such family will
have a consumption pattern that differs from that of the typical
family; in particular it is likely to buy a more expensive personal
Nonetheless, I maintain the exclusion for personal
residence.
residence expenditures at the 300,000 level that putatively reflects the
upper middle class American Dream.
TABLE 10.

RICH FAMILY'S TAX PAYMENTS

Gross
Wage

Income
Less Poverty

Progressive
Income

Cumulative
Taxable

Lifetime
Income

Income

Subsistence

Taxes

Income*

Taxes

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42

430,500
315,000
442,500
555,000

349,500
215,000
342,500
455,000

80,850
40,500
78,750
112,500

349,500
564,500
707,000
1,062,000

29,025
64,125
152,310

43-47
48-52

630,000
675,000

544,000
600,000

139,200
156,000

1,606,000
2,206,000

173,160
162,000

53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

630,000
460,500
145,500

555,000
385,500
70,500
(75,000)
(75,000)
(75,000)

142,500
91,650
10,575

2,761,000
3,146,500
3,217,000
3,142,000
3,367,000
3,292,000

149,850
104,085
19,035
40,500

*Cumulative taxable income takes into account housing expenses.

I will ignore the fact that the net present value of the taxes
imposed under the lifetime income tax is only 97% of the net present
value of the taxes imposed under the progressive income tax; this
shortfall could be rectified by, for example, adding a 30% income tax
bracket for cumulative lifetime income in excess of 2,250,000. In any
event, however, whether the final tax bracket under the lifetime
income tax imposed a 27% or a 30% rate, it would not impose a
marginal rate that was higher than the marginal rate under the
traditional progressive income tax. Accordingly, for the reasons
discussed above in the case of the typical family, it would be unlikely
that the rich family would significantly cut back on the amount of its
work.
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2. Savings vs. Consumption
In my illustrations, both the progressive income tax and the
lifetime income tax actually impose a tax not on income, but on
wages. (Since the great majority of the typical family's income is
derived from wages, this should hardly be surprising.) With respect to
each tax, my additional assumptions about after-tax interest expense
(uniformly 15% per tax period, whether the family has low or high
wage income) and after-tax interest income (uniformly 10% per tax
period, whether the family has low or high wage income) are
equivalent to an assumption that interest, whether flowing out or
flowing in, is taxed at rates that are independent of the rates applied
to wages. 21 In particular, interest under either regime could be taxed
at a 0% rate without affecting my illustrations or my proposal. Of
course, if interest were taxed at such a 0% rate, neither the
progressive income tax nor the lifetime income tax would discourage
savings at the expense of consumption. Thus, without more, it is
impossible to conclude that the lifetime income tax would negatively
impact a family's savings rate.
3. Social Engineering
Finally, before leaving incentive effects, it is worth saying that the
lifetime income tax would likely encourage home ownership (since a
family can defer taxes on up to 300,000 of income by buying a house)
and would, if some or all of the zero-bracket amount were made
contingent on the family's incurring educational expenses, encourage
higher education as well. This is entirely deliberate. First, home
purchases and higher education expenditures are likely to be the most
significant sources of a family's debt, and thus are a significant
contributing factor in a family's need to borrow to pay its income
taxes under a traditional progressive income tax regime. Any tax
regime that attempts to ameliorate the economic effects of a family's
borrowing can hardly afford not to give them special consideration.
Second, homes and higher education are, for better or for worse, the
29

For example, my tables are consistent with nominal rates for borrowing and

lending of 15% and 10%, respectively, provided that no tax is imposed on interest
flows. And they are consistent with nominal rates for borrowing and lending of 30%
and 20%, respectively, provided that a 50% tax rate is imposed on all interest flows.
And they are consistent with nominal rates for borrowing and lending of 15% and
15%, respectively, provided that no tax is imposed on interest expense outflows and a
33.3% tax rate is imposed on interest inflows. And so on.
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bedrock of the upper middle class American Dream. Accordingly,
any tax regime that seeks to move families ahead in their attempts to
reach such Dream should make special allowances in these areas.
True, this is social engineering. But it is social engineering of
precisely the type that the current progressive income tax regime
already engages in (albeit not as effectively).
C. Income Averaging
The motivation of the lifetime income tax regimes heretofore
offered up by the academic literature has largely been to offset the
negative impact that progressive income tax rates may have on
taxpaying units with volatile income patterns. 3° That is, under a
progressive income tax regime, two taxpaying units who over the
course of their lifetimes earn identical (in terms of present value)
amounts of pre-tax wage income may pay considerably different (in
terms of present value) amounts of tax on such income. In particular,
if one such unit earns its income in a very steady fashion, while the
other earns its income in fits and starts, the former unit will generally
pay less tax than the latter.3 If, instead, a tax is imposed on each
taxpaying unit's lifetime income, this disparity will inevitably be
largely eliminated.
This paper is not directly concerned with the detrimental effects
that a progressive income tax regime can have on taxpaying units with
wildly fluctuating incomes. Thus, I have not portrayed the typical
family as being confronted by any (significant) amount of income
volatility. Nonetheless, given the prominent role that the detrimental
effects of progressive income taxes is given in the existing lifetime
income tax literature, I now consider two "atypical" families, each of
which faces considerable income volatility. My baseline will continue
to be the typical family discussed in Part I. The first atypical family
will, in the first five-year tax period, earn all of the income earned by
the typical family in the first five-year tax period and one-third of the

30

William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL.

ECON. 379 (1939); Jeffrey Liebman, Should Taxes be Based on Lifetime Income?
Vickrey Taxation Revisited, New York University Colloquium on Tax Policy and
Public Finance (Spring 2003).
31 To the extent that the tax regime imposes taxes on income other than
wage
income, this differential effect on wage income might be masked. But in that case, my
statement would be true as applied more broadly to all income. In any event, my
focus in this paper is on wage income; that is also the focus in the extant lifetime
taxation literature.
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income earned by the typical family in the second five-year tax period.
The first atypical family will then, in the second five-year tax period,
earn the remaining two-thirds of the income earned by the typical
family in the second five-year tax period. This pattern will then
reverse itself in the following pair of five-year tax periods, and the
entire twenty-year pattern will then be repeated. Finally, the first
atypical family's resulting lifetime income pattern will be multiplied
by a factor that insures that such pattern has the same net present
value as the typical family's much smoother lifetime income pattern.
The second atypical family's income pattern is
See Table 11.
constructed similarly, except that it will, in the first five-year tax
period, earn only two-thirds of the income earned by the typical
family in the first five-year tax period, with the remainder allocated to
the second five-year tax period, along with all of the income earned by
the typical family in the second five-year tax period. I then reverse
this pattern in the following pair of five-year tax periods, and repeat
the entire twenty-year pattern as necessary. See Table 11.
TABLE 11.

VOLATILE INCOME PATTERNS

Typical
Income

Cumulative
Income

Atypical
Income
1

Cumulative
Income

Atypical
Income
2

Cumulative
Income

23-27

287,000

287,000

356,640

356,640

191,889

191,889

28-32

210,000

497,000

139,859

496,499

306,555

498,444

33-37

295,000

792,000

196,468

692,967

419,548

917,992

38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72

370,000
420,000
450,000
420,000
307,000
97,000

1,162,000
1,582,000
2,032,000
2,452,000
2,759,000
2,856,000
2,856,000

467,860
569,425
299,697
279,717
446,549
96,903

1,160,827
1,730,252

247,383
280,813

1,165,375
1,446,188

2,029,949
2,309,666
2,756,215
2,853,118
2,853,118

591,713
523,850
205,261
64,854
32,206

2,037,901
2,561,751
2,767,012
2,831,866
2,864,072

pre-23

73-77
78-82

2,856,000
2,856,000

32

2,853,118
2,853,118

2,864,072
2,864,072

To determine the necessary factor, I discounted each family's lifetime income

by the periodic rate of 12.5% (reflecting the average of the lending rate of 10% and
the borrowing rate of 15%). Applying this discount rate, the income earned by the
first atypical family needs to be multiplied by a factor of approximately 0.999 in order
to have the same net present value as the income earned by the typical family, and the
income earned by the second atypical family needs to be multiplied by a factor of
approximately 1.0006 in order to have the same net present value as the income
earned by the typical family.
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Focusing initially on the first atypical family, note how the pattern
of tax payments depends on whether the progressive income tax, the
15% pure flat tax, or the lifetime income tax, is imposed. See Table
12.
TABLE 12.

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

TAXES IMPOSED ON VOLATILE INCOME (FIRST
ATYPICAL FAMILY)

Variation 1
Income Poverty
Level

Progressive
Tax

Variation 1
Gross
Income

15%
Flat Tax

Cumulative
Taxable
Income

Lifetime
Income
Tax

275,640
39,859
96,468
367,860
483,425
224,697
204,717
371,549
21,903

58,692
5,979
14,470
86,358
121,028
43,409
37,415
87,465
3,285

356,640
139,859
196,468
467,860
569,425
299,697
279,717
446,549
96,903

53,496
20,979
29,470
70,179
85,414
44,955
41,958
66,982
14,535

275,640
315,499
211,967
479,827
963,252
1,187,949
1,392,666
1,764,215
1,786,118

208,463
78,560
67,557
106,758
5,914

(75,000)

1,711,118

(75,000)
(75,000)

1,936,118
1,861,118

40,500

Following the same methodology heretofore employed, it is
possible to compare the family's terminal net worth under each of
these three tax regimes. That is, I assume notwithstanding the
volatility of the atypical family's income stream that such family
continues to make exactly the same consumption expenditures at
exactly the same times (and hence in amounts that have exactly the
same net present value). To the extent that the family cannot meet its
current consumption and tax expenditures, it borrows, and so on.
Table 13 collapses these various steps. In particular, it shows how the
first atypical family's two expenditures that differ from tax regime to
tax regime - namely taxes paid and interest paid or received - vary
dramatically across the three regimes.
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TABLE

13. TAXES PAID AND INTEREST PAID
(FIRST ATYPICAL FAMILY)

Cumulative
Progressive
Income
Tax

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Prog. Inc.

Cumulative
15%
Flat Tax

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Flat Tax

Cumulative
Lifetime
Income
Tax

Tax

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Life. Inc.
Tax

pre-23

23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

58,692
64,671
79,141
165,499
286,527
329,936
367,351
454,815
458,101
458,101
458,101
458,101

18,000
18,308
28,580
73,093
112,058
128,907
136,841
133,694
109,324
89,654
85,818
69,898

53,496
74,475
103,945
174,124
259,538
304,492
346,450
413,432
427,968
427,968
427,968
427,968

18,000
17,686
29,335
77,682
118,629
132,416
137,060
131,844
103,150
79,850
72,020
51,707

208,463
287,023
354,580
461,338
467,252
467,252
507,752
507,752

18,000
12,336
12,120
42,293
51,812
49,215
42,244
28,359
(5,892)
(36,168)
(51,672)
(76,375)

Note that the aggregate of taxes and interest paid during the
family's lifetime under the progressive income tax exceeds by
approximately 48,300 the aggregate of taxes and interest paid under
the 15% pure flat tax, and that the aggregate of taxes and interest paid
under the 15% pure flat tax in turn exceeds by approximately 48,300
the aggregate of taxes and interest paid under the lifetime income tax.
Viewing a move from the progressive income tax to the 15% pure flat
tax as a move that eliminates the relative burden of progressive
income taxation, and a move from the 15% pure flat tax to the
lifetime income tax as a move that essentially eliminates the burden of
inefficient borrowing, it is apparent that for the first atypical family
each of these burdens is of identical magnitude.
To test the robustness of this conclusion, I repeat the exercise
with the second atypical family. See Tables 14 and 15.
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TAXES IMPOSED ON VOLATILE INCOME
(SECOND ATYPICAL FAMILY)

Variation 2
Income Poverty
Level

Progressive
Tax

Variation
2
Gross
Income

15%
Flat
Tax

Cumulative
Taxable
Income

Lifetime
Income
Tax

Pre-23
23-27

110,889

16,633

191,889

28,783

110,889

28-32
33-37

206,555
319,548

37,967
71,864

306,555
419,548

45,983
62,932

317,444
436,992

38-42

147,383

22,107

247,383

37,107

484,375

43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62

194,813
516,713
448,850
130,261

34,444
131,014
110,655
19,539

280,813
591,713
523,850
205,261

42,122
88,757
78,578
30,789

679,188
1,195,901
1,644,751
1,775,012

63-67

(10,146)

64,854

9,728

1,764,866

68-72

(42,794)

32,206

4,831

1,722,072

73-77

(75,000)

1,947,072

78-82

(75,000)

1,872,072

TABLE 15.

80,635
209,013
139,435
35,170

46,456

TAXES PAID AND INTEREST PAID

(SECOND ATYPICAL FAMILY)

pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

Cumulative
Progressive
Income
Tax

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Prog. Inc.
Tax

Cumulative
15%
Flat Tax

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Flat Tax

16,633
54,600
126,464
148,572
183,016
314,030
424,685
444,224
444,224
444,224
444,224
444,224

18,000
36,712
47,942
68,704
103,789
146,481
153,473
132,514
105,886
86,610
79,987
61,001

28,783
74,767
137,699
174,806
216,928
305,685
384,263
415,052
424,780
429,611
429,611
429,611

18,000
38,534
53,063
76,278
116,434
166,111
174,795
151,926
124,322
104,946
98,694
80,117

Cumulative
Lifetime
Income
Tax

80,635
289,647
429,083
464,253
464,253
464,253
510,709
510,709

Cumulative
Interest
PAID
Life. Inc.
Tax
18,000
34,217
36,883
37,016
45,062
63,589
57,522
27,408
(7,728)
(36,362)
(53,280)
(78,944)
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In this variation, the aggregate of taxes and interest paid during
the family's lifetime under the progressive income tax is
approximately 4,500 less than the aggregate of taxes and interest paid
under the 15% pure flat tax, and the aggregate of taxes and interest
paid under the 15% pure flat tax exceeds by approximately 78,000 the
aggregate of taxes and interest paid under the lifetime income tax.
Again viewing a move from the progressive income tax to the 15%
pure flat tax as a move that essentially eliminates the relative burden
of progressive income taxation (although, for this atypical family, the
progressive income tax regime actually provides a small benefit
relative to a purely flat tax), and a move from the 15% pure flat tax to
the lifetime income tax as a move that essentially eliminates the
burden of inefficient borrowing, it is apparent that for this atypical
family the second of these burdens is significantly larger than the first.
Thus, it appears that even for taxpaying units suffering (by virtue
of their volatile income streams) from the pernicious effects of a
progressive tax rate structure, the benefit they would receive from an
elimination of the progressive rate structure is no greater than, and
indeed is likely smaller than, the benefit they would receive from
being unburdened of the obligation to engage in inefficient taxinduced borrowing. Moreover, all other taxpaying units would receive
no benefit at all from an elimination of the progressive rate structure,
but would receive a substantial benefit from being unburdened of the
obligation to engage in inefficient tax-induced borrowing.33 These
facts can lead to but one conclusion: if a lifetime income tax regime
were ever seriously considered, it should be one that not only
eliminates the pernicious effects of a progressive tax rate structure,
but one that eliminates the pernicious effects of inefficient taxinduced borrowing. 4
33 Although not directly illustrated in the Tables in the text, for the typical

family, a move from the progressive income tax to the 15% pure flat tax would, under
my assumptions, actually lead to a decline of 14,000 in terminal net worth. The
reason for this is that the 15% pure flat tax imposes higher income taxes on taxpayers
earning lower levels of income, and thus imposes higher income taxes during the
typical family's first few tax periods. These tax periods, of course, are also those
during which the typical family maintains its highest debt levels. Thus, all such
incremental tax payments cause increases in the family's net interest payments.
.4 The Vickrey lifetime income tax produces a second benefit in addition
to
eliminating the pernicious effects of a progressive tax rate structure on taxpaying
units with volatile income patterns: it also provides a modicum of "income
smoothing." That is, if a taxpaying unit suffers from a decline in income after having
dutifully paid taxes on higher incomes in prior tax periods, it will likely receive a
refund: its average income will have fallen, and so too will its average marginal tax
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION

While the lifetime income tax is easy to design in the case of a
single typical family (or any other typical taxpaying unit), it is
somewhat harder to design when a myriad of "atypical"
circumstances, ranging from divorce and remarriage on the one hand
to immigration and expatriation on the other, must be taken into
account. The reason is obvious: the lifetime income tax imposes a tax
on cumulative lifetime income, but cumulative lifetime income is welldefined only when a taxpaying unit is well-defined and cumulative
lifetime income is taxable only when the taxpaying unit's entire life is
lived within the taxing government's jurisdiction. I will not attempt to
provide rules that would enable the lifetime income tax to be
seamlessly applied to all atypical circumstances. Rather, I will show
that it is possible to construct a more traditional periodic income tax
that in many ways approximates the lifetime income tax, but that is
"portable" and therefore relatively easily applicable to atypical
circumstances.
Thus, consider a periodic tax that is designed as follows. First, as
always, a family's income up to the level of poverty subsistence is
exempt, but this exemption is implemented by means of allowing the
family a deduction in an amount equal to the level of poverty
subsistence." Second, excess medical costs of elderly family members
rate; accordingly it will, in retrospect, have overpaid its taxes in prior tax periods.
This refund can be used to pay for incremental consumption at precisely those
moments when the taxpaying unit has the most difficulty (due to its reduced income
level) paying for such consumption. Hence the name "income smoothing." The
lifetime income tax that I have sketched in this paper does not have this feature since
I have chosen not to make the tax refundable. But it would be easy to add such a
feature. In the case of the typical taxpaying unit illustrated in Tables 7 and 8, the key
change would be that such unit would be entitled to a tax refund in the 68-72 and 7882 tax periods, since in both periods it would have negative taxable income (due to
having income below the poverty subsistence level). Giving the family a tax refund in
such periods would not be costless because the government would need to increase
taxes on such unit's prior income in order to pay for the future tax refunds. However,
the total increase in cost would be manageable: raising tax rates by a single
percentage point would suffice. Thus, if taxes imposed were 0% on the first 500,000
of taxable income, 46% on the next 500,000, 34% on the next 500,000 and 28%
thereafter, the government would be able to pay for the desired income smoothing.
35 The purpose of this structure is to allow a family with income
below the
poverty subsistence level to report a taxable loss, which loss it will be allowed to carry
forward. I do not allow a similar deduction for "the good stuff" because such a
deduction would increase the amount of the loss carryforward and would therefore
lead to a significant revenue loss. Ultimately, significantly higher marginal tax rates
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are deductible in amounts equal to 2,500 per adult per annum for
adults of ages 65 to 69, 3,000 per adult per annum for adults ages 70 to
74, 3,500 per adult per annum for adults ages 75 to 79, and 4,000 per
adult per annum for adults ages 80 and above. Third, education costs
incurred by an individual are partially deductible: each taxpayer is
allowed to deduct up to 60,000 for the cost of her own education, and
each family is allowed to deduct up to 60,000 for the cost of educating
each of their children. Fourth, the cost of a family's principle
residence (or upgrade) is deductible in an amount up to 300,000. As a
corollary, however, the family is required to include in taxable income
any gain from the sale of such residence. Fifth, and critically, to the
extent that the family incurs a taxable loss (negative taxable income
after applying the foregoing rules) in a given tax period, it is entitled
to carry such loss forward to offset taxable income in subsequent tax
16
periods. Finally, the family's taxable income in any given tax period,
computed in accordance with the foregoing rules, is taxed according to
the following modified flat rate structure: the first 80,000 is taxed at a
0% rate, and any excess over 80,000 is taxed at a 49.7% rate.37 See
Table 16.

would be required to offset such revenue loss.
36 I do not allow losses to be carried back for two reasons. First, the lifetime
income tax as I designed it does not have a carryback feature: the ultimate amount of
lifetime income tax is based not on cumulative lifetime income but rather on the
highest level of cumulative lifetime income achieved at the end of any tax period.
Second, the present value of the revenue loss from allowing a carryback would be
significant, and would thus force a significant increase in the ultimate marginal tax
rate.
37 While the nominal amount of taxes collected under this scheme differs from
that under the lifetime income tax, the present value of these taxes is the same.
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16. A PERIODIC TAX THAT APPROXIMATES THE LIFETIME
TAX
Income less
Poverty
Subsistence's

Education
and
Housing

Loss
Carryforward

Taxable
Income

Taxes

Deductions
pre-23

23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

(120,000)

206,000
110,000
195,000
270,000
334,000
375,000
345,000
232,000
7,000
(103,000)
(108,000)
(113,000)

(120,000)

(120,000)
(200,000)
(100,000)
(90,000)
(30,000)

300,000

(5,000)

(103,000)

86,000
110,000
(5,000)
165,000
244,000
345,000
345,000
232,000
7,000
(103,000)
89,000
(113,000)

2,982
14,910
42,245
81,508
131,705
131,705
75,544

4,473

Table 17 shows the effects the imposition of this periodic tax
would have on the typical family's finances. In particular, it shows
that while the family would need to engage in some borrowing to pay
its tax liabilities, the amount of such borrowing would be significantly
less than under either the 15% pure flat tax or the progressive income
tax. Taking into account the savings on net lifetime interest expense,
the family would end up with a terminal net worth that, while slightly
less than under the lifetime income tax, was nonetheless significantly
greater than its terminal net worth under either the 15% pure flat tax
or the progressive income tax.

Poverty subsistence in this table reflects the incremental medical expense
deduction for the elderly.
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TABLE 17. INCOME LESS CONSUMPTION AND A PERIODIC TAX
THAT SOMEWHAT APPROXIMATES THE LIFETIME TAX AND
INTEREST

Cumulative
Income Less

Cumulative
Taxes

Cumulative
Income Less

Cumulative
Interest

Cumulative
Income Less

Consumption

Cons +
Taxes

Cons + Taxes
+ Interest

(120,000)
5,000
15,000
(90,000)
(20,000)
138,000
408,000
678,000
835,000
767,000
589,000
706,000
518,000

(120,000)
2,018
(2,892)
(107,892)
(80,137)
(3,645)
134,650
272,945
354,401
286,401
108,401
220,928
32,928

(120,000)
(15,982)
23,289)
(131,783)
(123,795)
(65,872)
62,542
207,091
309,256
272,182
121,400
246,067
82,673

Pre-23
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-52
53-57
58-62
63-67
68-72
73-77
78-82

(2,982)
(17,892)
(17,892)
(60,137)
(141,645)
(273,350)
(405,055)
(480,599)
(480,599)
(480,599)
(485,072)
(485,072)

(18,000)
(20,397)
(23,891)
(43,658)
(62,227)
(72,108)
(65,854)
(45,145)
(14,219)
12,999
25,139
49,745

It is worthwhile to make two additional points about this periodic
approximation of the lifetime income tax. First, it could be tweaked
in a myriad of ways, each of which could serve to align more closely
the tax payments required under the approximation with the tax
payments required under the lifetime income tax. I have not
attempted to derive the closest-of-all-approximations, in large part out
of a desire to avoid unnecessary complexity. Second, under any tweak
of the periodic approximation, there would be a need to impose an
almost 50% average tax rate on income in excess of the requisite 0%
bracket amount. This means that the periodic approximation will
impose on the typical family a significantly higher marginal income
tax rate (49.7% in my illustration) than does the lifetime income tax
(27% in my illustration)."
This is not entirely true, but is true provided I care, as I did when designing
the lifetime income tax, that average income tax rates are not regressive. See supra
note 12. In the instant case, the combination of a 0% tax bracket in the amount of
80,000, which is necessary to reduce as much as possible the need for the family to
borrow to pay its taxes, and a 50% tax bracket in the amount of at least around
265,000, which is necessary to raise the government's required revenue, yield an
average tax rate of approximately 38%. Thus, if a third and lower tax rate were
introduced, say for taxable income in excess of 345,000 per tax period, such tax rate
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CONCLUSION

In this paper I have proposed replacing the current individual
Federal income tax with a lifetime income tax. Such a tax would have
a number of benefits that have been identified by other scholars. For
example, it is well understood that the burden imposed by a lifetime
income tax is largely immune from the vagaries of income volatility:
an individual with highly volatile income would pay neither more nor
less tax than an individual with smooth income, provided only that
both such individuals earn the same aggregate amount of income over
their lifetimes.
The lifetime income tax I propose differs from any that has been
proposed before in that it concentrates tax payments in tax periods in
which individuals are likely to have a surplus of disposable income,
after taking into account "typical" consumption patterns. The
additional benefit derived from this structure is that individuals would
be able to reduce the amount of their direct borrowings: in essence,
they would shift a portion of what would have been direct borrowings
to the government. Since the government is a more efficient borrower
than any individual, the interest rate charged on the shifted
borrowings will be lower than the interest rate that would have been
charged on a like amount of direct borrowings. Viewed over the
course of a typical lifetime, this reduction in interest expense would
produce a significant benefit.

could be no lower than 38%, unless the government chose to tolerate a scheme that
was regressive. This 38% is therefore the floor on the ultimate marginal income tax
rate.

